The European Banking Union aims to ensure financial stability in the euro area and is based on three pillars: a single supervisory mechanism, a single resolution mechanism and a deposit guarantee scheme. With regard to the overriding goal of financial stability, the third pillar is of crucial importance: the deposit guarantee scheme aims to strengthen the trust of the depositors in order to avoid bank runs. The economic crisis in 2008 showed that several depositguarantee schemes with-in the EU were underfunded. In several occasions the state needed to intervene (eg Austria). Due to the weaknesses and the lack of confidence in the financial markets, the European Commission initiated a harmonization on Deposit Guaran-tee Schemes throughout the euro area by endorsing the Directive 2014/49/EU. The paper focuses on assessing the significant changes that have been introduced with the new Directive 2014/49/EU with special focus on Austria. Besides the fact that the Austrian deposit guarantee scheme in previous years foresaw an expost funding at the time of bank failure regardless any risk taken by the specific bank, the state guaranteed for a significant portion of covered deposits. The new Directive includes an exante riskbased contribution paid by the banks, which in-tended to reflect the individual risk taken by the respective bank. A simulation cal-culation highlights the effects of the risk-based contributions on the financial statements of three Austrian banks involving several scenarios. In addition, the results showed that for banks with crossborder exposure, the riskbased contribu-tions have been significantly higher than for national operators. As a further milestone to strengthen peoples confidence in the financial sector, the European Commission published a draft regulation for a unified European Deposit Guarantee Scheme (EDIS) until 2024. This draft contains important components of this successive unification of all deposit guarantee funds across Euro area, but responses are extremely controversial. The paper focuses on the main points of discussion which range from differences in economic policy between the member states, competition issues, possible implicit state liability and many more. The outcome of this paper is that the discrepancies between the involved parties appear to be too great, which makes a timely implementation of EDIS almost impossible.